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A MODEST REFORM FOR FEDERAL 
PROCEDURAL RULEMAKING 
CARL TOBIAS* 
The Judicial Conference of the United States Advisory Committee on Civil 
Rules (the "Advisory Committee"), which has primary responsibility to study the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (the "Federal Rules") and to formulate rec-
ommendations for improvement, recently developed a thorough package of revi-
sions to the Federal Rules that govern discovery.1 During April 2000, the United 
States Supreme Court promulgated essentially intact the set of amendments that 
the Advisory Committee had proposed.2 Those changes became effective in 
December 2000.3 
The rule revision entities commissioned discovery studies, developed propos-
als, and solicited and considered extensive public input on the recommended al-
terations to the Federal Rules. Despite concerted effort, the efficacy of the new 
amendments remains unclear, partly because federal district courts have not ac-
tually applied them. The revisions, this deficiency in the amendment process, and 
prospects for its remediation warrant analysis. 
The efforts to revise the rules commenced several years ago. In 1996, the Advi-
sory Committee appointed a Discovery Subcommittee that it asked to explore the 
prospect of additional changes to the Federal Rules' discovery provisions, a 
number of which the Supreme Court had amended as recently as 1993.4 The 
Discovery Subcommittee investigated the necessity of further altering the discov-
ery provisions, in part by commissioning several assessments that two expert en-
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1. See Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the U.S., Pro-
posed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Evidence, 181 F.R.D. 18 (1999) 
[hereinafter Proposed Amendments]. See generally Elizabeth G. Thornburg, Giving the "Haves" a Lit-
tle More: Considering the 1998 Discovery Proposals, 52 SMU L. REV. 229 (1999); Carl Tobias, Discov-
ery Reform Redux, 31 CONN. L. REV. 1433 (1999). 
2. See Amendments to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 192 F.R.D. 340 (2000). 
3. The revisions took effect because Congress did not exercise its authority under the Rules Ena-
bling Act to alter them. See 28 U.S.C. § 2074(a) (1994). See generally Stephen B. Burbank, The Rules 
Enabling Act of 1934, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1015 (1982); Carl Tobias, Improving the 1988 and 1990 Judi-
cial Improvements Acts, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1589, 1599-1600 (1994). 
4. See Order Amending the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 507 U.S. 1091 (1993); Paul V. 
Niemeyer, Here We Go Again: Are The Federal Discovery Rules Really in Need of Amendment?, 39 
B.C. L. REV. 517, 521 (1998) [hereinafter Niemeyer, Here We Go Again]; Memorandum from Paul V. 
Niemeyer, Chair, Advisory Committee on Civil Rules to Alicemarie H. Stotler, Chair, Committee on 
Rules of Practice and Procedure, 181 F.R.D. 24, 25 (1999) [hereinafter Stotler Memorandum]. 
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tities conducted. One of these institutions was the Federal Judicial Center (the 
"FJC"), the principal research arm of the federal courts.5 The second body ;was 
the Institute for Civil Justice of the RAND Corporation (the "ICJ"), which had 
recently completed a comprehensive evaluation of the procedures for reducing 
expense and delay adopted and enforced by the ninety-four federal district 
courts under the Civil Justice Reform Act (the "CJRA") of 1990.6 The FJC and 
the ICJ collected and analyzed considerable empirical data on the application and 
operation of the 1993 revisions of the Federal Rules.7 
The Advisory Committee substantially relied on those studies m 
formulating a group of proposed amendments to the discovery rules for the 
consideration of the Judicial Conference Committee on Rules of Practice and 
Procedure (the "Standing Committee"),8 which reviews proposals developed by 
the advisory committees on appellate, bankruptcy, civil, criminal, and 
evidentiary rules. The Standing Committee instituted few modifications to the 
Advisory Committee draft and published proposed revisions on which it sought 
public input.9 The Standing Committee then evaluated the public comments, 
minimally changed the suggested alterations, and, in 1999, compiled a final 
package of proposed amendments for the Judicial Conference, the 
policymaking arm of the federal courts.10 The Conference made one 
modification in the set that the Advisory Committee tendered11 and submitted the 
5. See 28 U.S.C. § 620 (1994). See generally William W Schwarzer, The Federal Judicial Center 
and the Administration of Justice in the Federal Courts, 28 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1129 (1995); Russell 
Wheeler, Empirical Research and the Politics of Judicial Administration: Creating the Federal Judicial 
Center, 51 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 31(Summer1988). 
6. See, e.g., JAMES S. KAKALIK ET AL., AN EVALUATION OF MEDIATION AND EARLY NEUTRAL 
EVALUATION UNDER THE CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT (1996); JAMES S. KAKALIK ET AL., JUST, 
SPEEDY, AND INEXPENSIVE? AN EVALUATION OF JUDICIAL CASE MANAGEMENT UNDER THE CIVIL 
JUSTICE REFORM ACT (1996). See generally Tobias, supra note 3. 
7. See James S. Kakalik et al., Discovery Management: Further Analysis of the Civil Justice Reform 
Act Evaluation Data, 39 B.C. L. REV. 613 (1998); Thomas E. Willging et al., An Empirical Study of Dis-
covery and Disclosure Practice Under the 1993 Federal Rule Amendments, 39 B.C. L. REV. 525 (1998); 
see also Memorandum from Paul V. Niemeyer, Chair, Advisory Committee on Civil Rules to Anthony 
H. Scirica, Chair, Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure, 192 F.R.D. 354, 357-58 (2000) [here-
inafter Scirica Memorandum]. 
8. See Terry Carter, The Latest Discovery Mission: Judges Set to Debate Changes That Would 
Make New Federal Rules Mandatory, 85 A.B.A. J. 20 (Sept. 1999); Stotler Memorandum, supra note 4, 
at 24. The Advisory Committee rejected, on a 9-4 vote, deletion of the provision that would narrow 
discovery's scope. See Scirica Memorandum, supra note 7, at 359-60; see also John S. Beckerman, Con-
fronting Civil Discovery's Fatal Flaws, 84 MINN. L. REV. 505, 542 n.154 (2000). 
9. See generally Proposed Amendments, supra note l. 
10. The Standing Committee rejected, on a 10-2 vote, deletion of the provision that would narrow 
the scope of discovery. See Letter from Richard H. Middleton, Jr., President, Association of Trial 
Lawyers of America to William H. Rehnquist, Chief Justice of the United States (Apr. 12, 2000). 
11. The Conference deleted the "cost bearing" stricture, which would have authorized judges to 
permit discovery that was disproportionate to the needs of a case only if the party seeking broader dis-
covery paid for it. See Proposed Amendments, supra note 1, at 87-89 (Amendment to Rule 34(b)); see 
also Scirica Memorandum, supra note 7, at 360. See generally Thornburg, supra note 1, at 239-40; To-
bias, supra note 1, at 1441. 
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group to the Supreme Court;12 the Court promulgated the revisions without 
change in April 2000.13 
These amendments alter the present discovery regime in several significant 
ways. First, one of the 2000 Amendments imposing mandatory prediscovery, or 
automatic disclosure, requires parties to divulge less information than the 1993 ver-
sion.14 Moreover, the 2000 Amendments' automatic disclosure provision applies 
nationally; it thus eliminates the 1993 provision that authorized each of the 
ninety-four federal district courts to opt out by changing the strictures in the 
federal rule or by rejecting those requirements altogether. 15 
The 2000 Amendments also narrow the scope of discovery that litigants 
have traditionally been able to secure. For many years, parties could acquire any 
information that was "relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending ac-
tion. "16 The new version, however, restricts the scope of discovery to material 
that is "relevant to the claim or defense," and litigants can secure information 
that is relevant to the subject matter only after parties file motions showing good 
cause why they are entitled to broader discovery.11 The objectives of those who 
revised the rule are to limit discovery and to prevent fishing expeditions by re-
stricting litigants to discovery that only implicates matters raised by them in the 
pleadings.18 
One important feature of the 2000 Amendments is that those responsible 
for federal rule revision formulated the comparatively significant modifications 
reviewed above, as well as additional changes, without systematically assem-
bling or evaluating any empirical data on the amendments ultimately prescribed. 
Indeed, they apparently had only a limited understanding of how the alterations 
will work in practice, because federal district judges had never actually applied 
12. The Conference also rejected, on a 13-12 vote, deletion of the provision that would narrow dis-
covery's scope. See Letter from Professor Thomas D. Rowe to Carl Tobias (Nov. 19, 1999) (on file with 
author). 
13. See generally Amendments to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, supra note 2. 
14. Compare FED. R. Crv. P. 26(a) (amended 1993) (requiring the disclosure of information that is 
"relevant to disputed facts alleged with particularity in the pleadings") with FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a) 
(amended 2000) (requiring the disclosure of information that "support[s a party's] claims or defenses, 
unless solely for impeachment"). 
15. Compare FED. R. Crv. P. 26(a) (amended 1993) with FED. R. Crv. P. 26(a) (amended 2000) 
and FED. R. C1v. P. 26(a), Advisory Committee Note, Amendments to Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure, supra note 2, at 384-85. 
16. FED. R. C1v. P. 26(b)(l) (1999). Information is discoverable, if it "appears reasonably calcu-
lated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence," even if it is not admissible at trial. Id.; see also 
Beckerman, supra note 8, at 513-17; Richard L. Marcus, Discovery Containment Redux, 39 B.C. L. REV. 
747, 748-79 (1998); Stephen N. Subrin, Fishing Expeditions Allowed: The Historical Background of the 
1938 Federal Discovery Rules, 39 B.C. L. REV. 691, 734-45 (1998). 
17. See FED. R. C1v. P. 26(b); see also Thornburg, supra note 1, at 237-39; Gregory P. Joseph, Civil 
Rules II, NAT'L L. J., Apr. 24, 2000, at A17. 
18. See FED. R. Crv. P. 26(b), Advisory Committee Note, Amendments to Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, supra note 2, at 388-90; Stotler Memorandum, supra note 4, at 27, 32-33; Edward D. Cava-
nagh, Obstacles in the Search for Truth; Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Hinder 
Discovery in Ways Unnecessary and Unjust, LEGAL nMES, July 27, 1998, at 21; see also Beckerman, supra 
note 8, at 540-42; Subrin, supra note 16, at 734-39. 
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the modifications, and attorneys and parties had not attempted to satisfy them. 
Of course, no evaluator has analyzed how the measures actually function. 
I am criticizing neither the substance of the 2000 Amendments nor the os-
tensibly open process by which they took effect. The benefits and disadvan-
tages of these changes, and the methods by which the entities developed and 
promulgated the alterations, have received cogent assessment elsewhere.19 No 
individual or institution, even those responsible for rule amendment, however, 
can know exactly how the new provisions will in fact operate until judges have 
employed them, lawyers and litigants have attempted to comply with the measures, 
and the devices have received careful scrutiny. 
One felicitous means of ascertaining how the proposed rule modifications will 
work as a practical matter is readily available. Congress should adopt the 1991 
proposed amendment in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 83 that would author-
ize the federal districts to test promising mechanisms for five years if the courts 
secure Judicial Conference approval.20 Unfortunately, the rule revision entities 
seemed to withdraw this proposed amendment out of deference for contempo-
raneous experimentation involving expense and delay reduction techniques un-
der the Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990.21 
This amendment would enable the Advisory Committee and other revisors 
to determine more precisely how procedural changes will work in practice. A 
small number, or a representative group, of districts could test apparently effi-
cacious measures that conflict with the federal rules or statutes for a significant 
period of not more than five years. This practice would permit judges to apply, 
construe, and enforce provisions; attorneys and parties to find, master, and sat-
isfy the strictures; and expert, independent evaluators to analyze the proce-
dures' relative effectiveness generally and their advantages and detriments spe-
cifically. With the information that the rule amendment entities derive from that 
experimentation, the revisors could recalibrate contemplated alterations. Those 
responsible for rule amendment might then recommend formal modifications 
with greater confidence about how the nascent measures would operate practi-
cally, while members of the bench and bar, as well as litigants, could comment 
19. See, e.g., Beckerman, supra note 8; Jeffrey W. Stempel, Ulysses Tied to the Generic Whipping Post. 
The Continuing Odyssey of Discovery "Reform," 64 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 197 (Spring/Summer 2001); 
Thornburg, supra note 1. But cf Scirica Memorandum, supra note 7, at 360-61 (praising the "thorough proc-
ess that the [Advisory] Committee followed, the quantity of information that it evaluated, and the "depth of 
debate over the policy considerations"). 
20. See Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure, Judicial Conference of the U.S., Proposed 
Rules: Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the 
Federal Rules of Evidence, 137 F.R.D. 53, 153 (1991) (proposing the revision in Rule 83(b)). See gen-
erally A. Leo Levin, Beyond Techniques of Case Management: The Challenge of the Civil Justice Re-
form Act of 1990, 67 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 877, 892-94 (1993); Laurens Walker, Perfecting Federal Civil 
Rules: A Proposal for Restricted Field Experiments, 51 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 67 (Summer 1988). 
21. See FED. R. Clv. P. 26(a)(l), Advisory Committee Note, Amendments to Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure, supra note 2, at 384-85; see also Levin, supra note 20, at 891-92; A. Leo Levin, Local 
Rules as Experiments: A Study in the Division of Power, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1567, 1582-83 (1991). See 
generally Paul D. Carrington, Learning From the Rule 26 Brouhaha: Our Courts Need Real Friends, 156 
F.R.D. 295 (1994). 
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on the suggested changes in a manner informed by experience of how they ac-
tually function. The recent decision to alter automatic disclosure illustrates 
these potential benefits. Rigorous testing and assessment of the device before it 
was officially imposed might have obviated the need to revise the provision so 
soon after its 1993 amendment.22 
Congress must expeditiously revitalize the proposed revision in Rule 83. 
Lawmakers should develop a new version premised on the 1991 proposal or a 
modified iteration of it; solicit public comment on the idea, perhaps in hearings; 
assess the public input that Congress receives; and pass legislation revising Rule 
83.23 This change would improve the quality of future amendments to the Fed-
eral Rules by facilitating productive experimentation with the procedures be-
fore the Supreme Court promulgates them. 
The Supreme Court recently prescribed a package of discovery revisions. 
Whether those amendments will prove effective remains unclear, in part be-
cause federal courts have not applied them. Congress should expeditiously rec-
tify this situation by adopting a proposed revision in Rule 83 that would 
authorize experimentation with promising procedures. 
22. See Griffin B. Bell et al., Automatic Disclosure in Discovery-The Rush to Reform, 27 GA. L. 
REV. 1, 17-18 (1992); Linda S. Mullenix, Hope Over Experience: Mandatory Informal Discovery and the 
Politics of Rulemaking, 69 N.C. L. REV. 795, 813-21 (1991). See generally Tobias, supra note 3, at 1611. 
23. For a careful exposition of why Congress is the preferable entity to effectuate this change, see 
Levin, supra note 20, at 892-94; Levin, supra note 21, at 1585-87. See generally Tobias, supra note 3, at 
1633. 
